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Abstract—Secret-key generation exploiting the channel reci-
procity between two legitimate parties is an interesting alterna-
tive solution to cryptographic primitives for key distribution in
wireless systems as it does not rely on an access infrastructure
and provides information-theoretic security. The large majority
of works in the literature generally assumes that the eavesdrop-
per gets no side information about the key from her observations
provided that (i) it is spaced more than a wavelength away
from a legitimate party and (ii) the channel is rich enough
in scattering. In this paper, we show that this condition is
not always verified in practice and we analyze the secret-key
capacity under realistic propagation conditions.
Keywords—Secret-key capacity, channel reciprocity, propaga-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secrecy-capacity is defined as the number of bits per
channel use that can be reliably transmitted to a legitimate
receiver (Bob) while guaranteeing a negligible information
leakage to the eavesdropper (Eve). The seminal work of
Wyner [1] and its extension to more general channels [2] have
shown that a "physical advantage" at Bob with respect to Eve
is required to guarantee a larger-than-zero secrecy capacity.
This "physical advantage" implies that Eve channel has to be
noisier, which might not be always verified in practice [3].
Later, the works of [4], [5] have shown that the pessimistic
limitation of requiring an advantage over the eavesdropper
can be overcome by using stronger communication schemes
that are not restricted to one-way rate-limited communica-
tions [3]. Maurer [4] and Ahlswede and Csiszár [5] were
the first to analyze the problem of generating a secret key
from correlated observations. In the source model (see Fig. 1),
two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) and one illegitimate
party (Eve) observe the realizations of a discrete memoryless
source. From their observations, Alice and Bob have to distill
an identical key that remains secret from Eve. Moreover,
Alice and Bob have access to a public error-free authenticated
channel with unlimited capacity. This helps them to agree
a common key with the limitation that Eve also can listen
to it. Upper and lower bounds for the secret-key capacity,
defined as the number of secret bits that can be generated
per observation of the source, were derived in [4], [5]. Their
results show that positive secret-key rates are achievable even
if the channel from Alice to Bob is not degraded with respect
to the channel from Alice to Eve.
A practical source of common randomness at Alice and
Bob consists of the wireless channel reciprocity, which im-
plies that the propagation channel from Alice to Bob and
from Bob to Alice is identical if both are measured within the
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Fig. 1: Source model for secret-key agreement.
same channel coherence time and at the same frequency. At
each coherence time, Alice and Bob can repeatedly sample
the channel by sending each other a pilot symbol so as to
obtain a set of N highly correlated observations and finally
start a key-distillation procedure. The vast majority of works
in the literature considers that Eve gets no side information
about the key from her observations, which consist of the
pilots transmitted by Alice and Bob [6]–[10]. Often, this
assumption is justified by the fact that: (i) Eve is supposed
to be separated from Bob and Alice by more than one
wavelength (otherwise she could be easily detected) and (ii)
the channel environment is supposed to be rich enough in
scattering implying that the fading process of the channels
at the different antennas can be considered independent. The
assumption of rapid decorrelation in space has been further
validated through measurement campaigns [6], [8], [11]–
[13]. Moreover, this assumption is convenient as it drastically
simplifies the problem of secret-key generation. Indeed, the
secret-key capacity simply becomes equal to the mutual
information between Alice and Bob since Eve cannot learn
anything about the key from her channel observations. This
implies that Eve can only learn about the secret-key from the
discussion over the public channel.
However, it often occurs in practical scenarios that scatter-
ers are clustered with small angular spread rather than being
uniformly distributed, which leads to much longer spatial
decorrelation length. Quite surprisingly, only a few works
have considered the impact of potential spatial correlation at
Eve’s side. For instance, ref. [14] studied the impact of chan-
nel sparsity, inducing correlated eavesdropping, on secret-
key capacity. However, no advanced physical characterization
of the propagation environment was considered. In [15],
correlation of the eavesdropper channel is taken into account
but the spatial and time correlation of the channel is modeled
according to Jakes Doppler model, which again assumes
a rich scattering environment and leads to decorrelation in
space after only a few wavelengths.
In the light of these limitations, we feel that a deep
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theoretical analysis of the impact of realistic propagation
environments on the secret-key capacity is still missing in
the literature. In this paper, as opposed to most of the works
in the literature, we characterize the secrecy-key capacity
without making the simplifying assumption of a rich scat-
tering environment. The obtained lower and upper bounds
for the secrecy-key capacity takes into account the impact
of realistic propagation environments, which controls the
spatial decorrelation of Eve. Eve is also allowed to have
a more powerful receiver than Alice and Bob, resulting in
a larger signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We show that, under
typical propagation conditions drawn from 3GPP models
[16], current evaluations of the secret-key capacity, relying
on a rich scattering assumption, are too optimistic as they
underestimate the information available at Eve’s side. New
5G technologies strongly relying on directive transmission,
such as Massive MIMO and milimeter-wave communications,
are other typical examples of small angular spreads that can
lead to long spatial decorrelation lengths.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold
lowercase and uppercase letters, respectively (resp.). Non
bold upper case letter refers to a random variable. The vector
notation ~r refers to a 3D position. Superscripts ∗, T and
H stand for conjugate, transpose and Hermitian transpose
operators. The symbols tr, E, = and < denote the trace,
expectation, imaginary and real parts, respectively.  is the
imaginary unit. The norm ‖A‖ is the Frobenius norm. |A| is
the determinant of matrix A. IN denotes the identity matrix
of order N . δ(t) is the Dirac delta.
II. TRANSMISSION MODEL
We assume that Alice and Bob extract a common key
from observations of their shared channel H , assumed to
be reciprocal. The channel H is estimated based on the
transmission of a priori known pilots by Alice and Bob.
We consider that the channel remains invariant during the
transmission of each pilot symbol. Assuming a narrowband
channel, the estimates of H at Alice’s and Bob’s sides,
respectively denoted by X and Y , are given by
X = H +WX , Y = H +WY ,
where the additive noise samples WX and WY are modeled
as zero mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (ZM-
CSCG) with variance NX and NY respectively.
The strategy of Eve consists in going as close as possible
from Bob’s antenna1. Then, Eve estimates her channel HZ
between Alice’s antenna and hers by intercepting the pilots
sent from Alice to Bob. Since Eve is close to Bob, the channel
from Alice to Eve will be spatially correlated with H while
the channel between Bob and Eve will experience a negligible
correlation with H . Therefore, we neglect the pilot sent by
Bob and received by Eve in the following as she cannot
get any useful information from it. We define the channel
estimate of Eve as
Z = HZ +WZ ,
where WZ is modeled as ZMCSCG with variance NZ . If
Alice and Bob transmit a pilot of equal power and Alice, Bob
1Note that all of the following is symmetrical if Eve gets close to Alice
instead of Bob.
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Fig. 2: Non-LOS channel propagation model: Eve gets close
to Bob to increase the spatial correlation between the channel
from Alice to her antenna HZ(t) and the channel from Alice
to Bob H(t). Scatterers, Bob and Eve are static but Alice is
moving.
and Eve use a similar receiver, one could expect a situation
of equal noise variance NX = NY = NZ . On the other
hand, Eve could use a more powerful receiver than Alice
and/or Bob by having, e.g., a larger antenna size, a multi-
antenna receiver or an amplifier with lower noise figure. This
would result in a lower noise variance NZ and a higher SNR.
Moreover, a different pilot power transmitted by Alice and
Bob will induce variations in their noise variance.
We consider a memoryless source model for secret-key
agreement [3], [5] as shown in Fig. 1. This implies that
Alice, Bob and Eve observes N independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the random variables
measurements X , Y and Z, giving XN = (X1, ..., XN ),
Y N = (Y1, ..., YN ) and ZN = (Z1, ..., ZN ). Moreover, a
noiseless authenticated public channel of unlimited capacity
is available for communication. All parties have access to the
public channel.
III. CHANNEL MODEL
In this section, we aim at providing a realistic model of
the channel H and HZ with particular emphasis on their cor-
relation in time and space. The assumption of i.i.d. repeated
measurements XN , Y N , ZN is well fulfilled in practice if
the measurements of the channel are repeated in time with a
sampling period that is large compared to the coherence time
of the channel. This time can be related to the degree of
mobility of Alice, Bob, Eve and the scattering environment.
In this paper, we assume that Bob and Eve and scatterers
are fixed while Alice is moving. This can model a typical
situation where Bob is a base station and Alice is a user
terminal. This implies that H and HZ change over time,
which leads to channel decorrelation in time. Alice is also
assume to be in a non line-of-sight (LOS) situation.
As opposed to previous approaches [7]–[10], we do not
consider a uniform distribution of scatterers in angle. Instead,
we consider a model where the channels H and HZ can
be described by the combination of L paths, as shown in
Fig. 2. The l-th path is characterized by an azimuth angle
φl and elevation angle θl at Bob and Eve side. Bob and
Eve belong to a local area, situated in the far field from
scatterers, so that the angles are identical at Bob and Eve.
Moreover they are assumed to remain constant in time over
the N measurements. The mobility of ALice induces a phase
drift of each multipath component, common at Bob and Eve,
that we denote by ψl(t). Bob and Eve positions are denoted
by ~rB ∈ R3×1 and ~rE ∈ R3×1 respectively in their local area
coordinate system. Alice, Bob and Eve are each equipped
with a single isotropic antenna. Under previous assumptions,
the narrowband multipath channels H and HZ at time t can
be modeled as [18]
H(t) =
L∑
l=1
αle
ψl(t)e−~βl·~rB
HZ(t) =
L∑
l=1
αle
ψl(t)e−~βl·~rE ,
where ~βl ∈ R3×1 is the wave vector associated to path
l at Bob/Eve side, which is directly related to the carrier
wavelength λ and points in direction (φl, θl). αl is the
complex gain of path l.
In the following, in accordance with conventional ap-
proaches in the propagation literature [19], we consider
multipath components as stochastic. Moreover, we assume
uncorrelated scatterers with a uniformly distributed phase so
that E(αl) = 0 and E(αlα∗l′) = Plδl−l′ with Pl = E(|αl|2).
We also define P =
∑
l Pl as the average power of scattered
paths. Non LOS measurement campaigns have shown that
the channels H(t) and HZ(t) can be accurately modeled
with a zero-mean Gaussian distribution, especially for large
values of L. Therefore, we assume that the random vector
(H(t), HZ(t))
T follows a joint circularly symmetric Gaus-
sian distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix given
by
E
(
H(t)
HZ(t)
)
=
(
0
0
)
, CHHZ = P
(
1 ρ
ρ∗ 1
)
.
We now study the spatial correlation coefficient ρ between
H(t) and HZ(t). Under previous assumptions, we can write
ρ = E [H(t)H∗Z(t)] =
1
P
L∑
l=1
Ple
−~βl·(~rB−~rE). (1)
Defining the normalized angular power density function f(Ω)
at Bob and Eve (per steradian) as
f(Ω) =
1
P
L∑
l=1
Plδ (Ω− Ωl)
δ (Ω− Ωl) = 1
sin θl
δ (φ− φl) δ (θ − θl) ,
we can rewrite (1) as
ρ =
∫
Ω
f(Ω)e−~βl·(~rB−~rE)dΩ, (2)
where the differential dΩ can be formulated in spherical
coordinates as dΩ = sin θdθdφ. Note that the wave vectors ~βl
depend on Ω through the angles (φl, θl). Since P =
∑L
l=1 Pl,
we have
∫
Ω
f(Ω)dΩ = 1 so that 0 ≤ |ρ| ≤ 1.
The formulation (2) in terms of f(Ω) is convenient as it
allows to represent both specular components and continuous
spectrum, which can occur in the case of diffuse scattering.
Typically, the value of ρ will decrease as (i) the distance
of Eve with respect to Bob ‖~rB − ~rE‖ increases and/or
(ii) as the distribution f(Ω) gets uniform over (φ, θ). The
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Fig. 3: Correlation coefficient |ρ| as a function of the distance
∆x = ‖~rB−~rE‖ along the xˆ axis. Three types of angular dis-
tributions are considered: (i) 3D-isotropic, ρ = sinc
(
2pi∆x
λ
)
,
(ii) 2-D isotropic, ρ = J0
(
2pi∆x
λ
)
and (iii) ρ = (2) with f(Ω)
a Laplacian distribution with elevation spread θrms = 5◦ and
different angular spreads φrms.
worst-case in terms of secrecy occurs in the extreme case
f(Ω) = δ(Ω − Ω1) (only one incoming direction for the
scattered paths) implying that |ρ| = 1. The opposite extreme
case is an isotropic distribution over azimuth and elevation
(3D-isotropic), i.e., f(Ω) = 14pi , which leads to the well-
known result [20, p. 49]
ρ = sinc
(
2pi‖~rB − ~rE‖
λ
)
, (3)
where sinc(x) = sinx/x. This shows that ρ becomes negligi-
ble after a few λ. Similarly, if scattered paths are coming from
a fixed horizontal elevation θ = pi/2 but are uniformly dis-
tributed in azimuth (2D-isotropic), i.e., f(Ω) = 12pi δ(θ−pi/2),
we get another well-known result [21]
ρ = J0
(
2pid
λ
)
,
where J0(.) is the zero-order Bessel function and d is the
distance between Eve and Bob in the horizontal plane. Here
again, ρ becomes negligible if d is larger than a few λ. This
was the justification of many works suggesting that Eve does
not get any useful information about H from Z as soon as
she is a few centimeters away from Bob for conventional
radio-frequency bands [6]–[10]. This implies that Eve can
only learn about H and thus the secret-key from the public
discussion between Alice and Bob.
In this paper, we do not make this assumption, which can
be too optimistic in terms of secrecy. In practice, the decay
of ρ as a function of ‖~rB − ~rE‖ will depend on the scat-
tering environment, which is often far from being uniformly
distributed in angle but rather clustered with specific angular
spreads. As an example, we compare in Fig. 3 the decay
of ρ as a function of the distance between Eve and Bob,
along the xˆ axis (φ = 0 and θ = pi/2), and different angular
distributions. In addition to the previously described 3D- and
2D-isotropic distributions, we also consider a more realistic
Laplacian distribution in azimuth and elevation, centered in
(φ, θ) = (0, pi/2), which is a common model for a base
station [22]
f(Ω) = γe−
√
2
|φ|
φrms
1
sin θ
e−
√
2
|θ−pi/2|
θrms ,
where φrms and θrms are the azimuth and elevation angu-
lar spreads respectively and γ is a normalization constant.
According to recent 3GPP standard channel models [16],
typical values of φrms range around 40◦ for an indoor office,
in [1◦, 10◦] for a rural environment and in [10◦, 40◦] for an
urban micro/macro cell environment while a typical value for
the elevation angular spread is θrms = 5◦. We can clearly
see in Fig. 3 that the 3D- and 2D-isotropic distributions
underestimate the spatial correlation between Bob and Eve.
In other words, considering these models overestimates the
secret-key capacity in scenarios of practical relevance. For
a typical cellular carrier frequency of 1 GHz, λ = 30 cm
and Eve could be placed at 10λ = 3 m while still having a
significant correlation with H . Moreover, as explained earlier,
Eve could also use a more powerful receiver than Alice and
Bob resulting in a lower noise variance NZ .
IV. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY
The secret-key capacity S(X;Y ||Z) is defined as the
maximum rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on a secret-
key while keeping the rate at which Eve obtains information
about the key arbitrarily small for sufficiently large N .
Moreover, Alice and Bob should agree on a common key with
high probability and the key should approach the uniform
distribution. We refer to [3]–[5] for a formal definition.
As explained above, we consider that Eve gets useful
information from her observation Z over H . This implies
that the secret-key capacity is not simply equal to I(X;Y ),
as opposed to many previous works. Finding the general
expression of the secret-key capacity for a given distribution
of X,Y, Z is still an open problem. From [4], [5] [3, Prop.
5.4], the secret-key capacity, expressed in the number of
generated secret bits per channel observation, can be lower
and upper bounded as follows
S(X;Y ||Z) ≥ I(X;Y )−min [I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)] (4)
S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ min [I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Z)] . (5)
The lower bound (4) implies that if Eve has less information
about Y than Alice or respectively about X than Bob, such
a difference can be leveraged for secrecy [4]. Moreover, this
rate can be achieved with one-way communication. On the
other hand, the upper bound (5) implies that the secret-key
rate cannot exceed the mutual information between Alice and
Bob. Moreover, the secret-key rate cannot be higher than the
mutual information between Alice and Bob if they happened
to learn Eve’s observation Z.
In particular cases, the lower and upper bounds can
become tight [3]–[5]. In the next subsections, we evalu-
ate the lower and upper bounds of (4) and (5), and their
simplification in the cases where the bounds become tight.
To do this, we use the fact that, from the system model
detailed in previous sections, the random variables X , Y
and Z are jointly circularly symmetric Gaussian distributed.
This implies that the entropy of these random variables only
depend on their covariance, which is equivalent to their
correlation given their zero mean. The entropy of a circularly
symmetric Gaussian with covarianceC is log2(|pieC|), where
e is the Euler number.
A. Lower Bound
The random variables X and Y are jointly Gaussian
distributed with covariance
CXY =
(
P +NX P
P P +NY
)
.
From this distribution, we find
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY ) (6)
= log2
(
1 +
P 2
(P +NX)(P +NY )− P 2
)
.
Moreover, X and Z are jointly Gaussian with covariance
CXZ =
(
P +NX ρP
ρ∗P P +NZ
)
.
This leads to the mutual information
I(X;Z) = log2
(
1 +
|ρP |2
(P +NX)(P +NZ)− |ρP |2
)
.
Using a similar methodology for Y , we find
I(Y ;Z) = log2
(
1 +
|ρP |2
(P +NY )(P +NZ)− |ρP |2
)
.
In the end, we find that the lower bound in (4) is equal to
S(X;Y ||Z) ≥ log2
 1 + P 2(P+NX)(P+NY )−P 2
1 + |ρP |
2
(P+max(NX ,NY ))(P+NZ)−|ρP |2
 .
As soon as |ρ| < 1, S(X;Y ||Z) is unbounded and goes to
infinity as P → +∞. Indeed, as P → +∞, I(X;Y )→ +∞
while I(X;Z) and I(Y ;Z) converge to log2
(
1 + |ρ|
2
1−|ρ|2
)
,
which is bounded for |ρ| < 1. Note that the lower bound is
not restricted to be positive (as will be shown in Section V), in
which case it becomes useless. We can find the condition on
the minimum noise variance at Eve NZ for having a larger-
than-zero lower bound
NZ > P (|ρ|2 − 1) + |ρ|2 min(NX , NY ). (7)
In the worst-case, |ρ| = 1 and NZ has to be larger than the
minimum of the noise variances of Alice and Bob. We can
invert (7) to find the maximal correlation coefficient |ρ|2 to
have a larger-than-zero lower bound
|ρ|2 < P +NZ
P + min(NX , NY )
.
From the definition of ρ in (2) and for a given propagation
environment inducing a specific angular power distribution
f(Ω), the last equation can be related to the minimal admis-
sible distance ‖~rB − ~rE‖ between Eve and Bob.
B. Upper Bound
To evaluate the upper bound in (5), we only need to
evaluate I(X;Y |Z) as we already evaluated the expression
I(X;Y ). To do this, first note that X , Y and Z are jointly
Gaussian distributed with covariance matrix
CXY Z =
(
P +NX P ρP
P P +NY ρP
ρ∗P ρ∗P P +NZ
)
,
which gives
I(X;Y |Z) = H(XZ) +H(Y Z)−H(Z)−H(XY Z)
= log2
( |CXZ ||CY Z |
(P +NZ)|CXY Z |
)
.
The upper bound is then given by the minimum of I(X;Y |Z)
and I(X;Y ). It is possible to prove that the condition
I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y ) is always verified under the assump-
tions of our channel model2 and thus
S(X;Y ||Z) ≤ log2
( |CXZ ||CY Z |
(P +NZ)|CXY Z |
)
.
One should note that the situation I(X;Y |Z) > I(X;Y )
could be possible in another context. This would imply that
the knowledge of Eve’s observation could help Alice and Bob
to generate secrecy. We refer to [23] for an analysis of the
quantity I(X;Y |Z)− I(X;Y ) and to [5] for its implication
in terms of secrecy.
C. Tight Bound
In our context, three particular cases can be distinguished.
1) ρ = 0, Eve does not learn anything about H from Z,
which becomes independent from X and Y . This leads to
the trivial result S(X;Y ||Z) = I(X;Y ), given in (6) and as
considered in [7]–[10].
2) NY = 0, Y = H , this implies that X → Y →
Z forms a Markov chain, which leads to I(X;Y |Z) =
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) [3, Corol. 4.1] and
S(X;Y ||Z) = log2
 1 + PNX
1 + |ρP |
2
(P+NX)(P+NZ)−|ρP |2
 .
3) NX = 0, X = H , symmetrically as in 2), we find
S(X;Y ||Z) = log2
 1 + PNY
1 + |ρP |
2
(P+NY )(P+NZ)−|ρP |2
 .
Cases 2) and 3) let us expect that the bounds become tight
as the receiver of Alice or Bob is significantly noisier than
the one of the other.
V. NUMERICAL VALIDATION
We evaluate numerically the secret-key capacity in Fig. 4
based on the formulas derived in Section IV for the
lower/upper bounds (LB/UB) and relying on the channel
models derived in Section III. We consider the same angular
distributions as in Fig. 3. We recall that an angular Laplacian
2Proof is omitted due to space constraints.
−14−12−10−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Distance ∆x [wavelength λ]
Se
cr
et
-k
ey
ca
pa
ci
ty
[b
its
/o
bs
er
va
tio
n]
~rB − ~rE = ∆x xˆ+ 0 yˆ + 0 zˆ
I(X;Y ) (ρ = 0)
2D-isotropic(LB)
2D-isotropic(UB)
Laplacian(LB)
Laplacian(UB)
φrms = [5
◦, 10◦, 20◦, 40◦]
Fig. 4: Lower bound (LB) and upper bound (UB) for secret-
key capacity as a function of propagation environments
considered in Fig. 3. The curve I(X,Y ) corresponds to the
case of independent observations at Eve (ρ = 0).
distribution is an accurate model for a base station with
varying angular spreads as a function of the propagation
environment. We consider signal-to-noise ratios P/NX =
P/NY = 10 dB at Alice and Bob while Eve is allowed
to have a more power receiver that achieves P/NZ = 20
dB. For a given angular spread, Fig. 4 gives the admissible
distance between Bob and Eve to achieve a given secret-key
capacity.
Here again, we see that the general assumption of con-
sidering that Eve’s observations Z are independent of X
and Y (ρ = 0) is well verified if scatterers are 2D-isotropic
distributed and if Eve is more than a wavelength away from
Bob. However, for practical angular spreads at the base sta-
tion, this assumption is typically not valid and too optimistic.
This implies that lower secret-key rates are achievable in
practice and privacy amplification should compensate for the
information that Eves learns about the key not only from
public discussion but also from her observations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the secret-key capacity
based on the principle of channel reciprocity. We have
shown that the assumption of full decorrelation of Eve’s
observations with respect to Alice and Bob is not always ver-
ified and critically depends on the propagation environment.
Our simulation results show that, for practical propagation
environments, the correlation of Eve’s observations is non
negligible implying a potentially significant reduction of the
secret-key capacity.
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